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Abstract
In “Some Remarks on Extending an Interpreting Theories with a Partial Truth Predicate”
Reinhardt (1986) famously proposed an instrumentalist interpretation of the truth theory
Kripke-Feferman (KF) in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Reinhardt suggested to view KF as a
tool for generating “the significant part of KF”, that is, as a tool for deriving sentences of the
form T pϕq. The constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program was whether it was possible
“to justify the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant
sentences”? This question was answered negatively by Halbach and Horsten (2006) but we
argue that under a more careful interpretation the question may receive a positive answer.
To this end, we propose to shift attention from KF-provably true sentences to KF-provably
true inferences, that is, we shall identify the significant part of KF with the set of pairs
〈Γ,∆〉, such that KF proves that if all members of Γ are true, at least one member of ∆ is
true. In way of addressing Reinhardt’s question we show that the provably true inferences
of KF coincide with the provable sequents of the theory Partial Kripke-Feferman (PKF).
1 Introduction
Kripke’s theory of truth (Kripke, 1975) is a cornerstone of contemporary research on truth and
the semantic paradoxes. The theory provides us with a strategy for constructing, that is defining,
desirable interpretations of a self-applicable truth predicate, so-called fixed points. These fixed
points can serve as interpretations of the truth predicate within non-classical models of the
language, as in Kripke’s original article, but can also be used in combination with classical
models, so called closed-off models.1 Feferman (1991) devised an elegant axiomatic theory of
the Kripkean truth predicate of these closed-off fixed-point models. The theory is known as
Kripke-Feferman (KF) and is still one of the most popular classical axiomatic truth theories in
the literature. Nonetheless, KF displays a number of unintended and slightly bizarre features,
which it inherits from the behavior of the truth predicate in the closed-off fixed-point models.
While in the non-classical fixed-point models the truth predicate is transparent, i.e., ϕ and T pϕq
will always receive the same semantic value, this no longer holds in the closed-off models. Rather
for each closed-off model there will be sentences ϕ, e.g. the Liar sentence, such that either ϕ and
¬T pϕq will be true in the model, or ¬ϕ and T pϕq will be true in the model. As a consequence
one can prove this counterintuitive disjunction in KF for the Liar sentence λ, i.e.
(∗) KF ⊢ (λ ∧ ¬T pλq) ∨ (¬λ ∧ T pλq).
∗luca.castaldo@bristol.ac.uk
†johannes.stern@bristol.ac.uk
1This was also suggested by Kripke (cf. Kripke, 1975, p.715).
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Since the transparency of truth seems to be one of the basic characteristica of the truth predicate,
the aforementioned asymmetry puts the idea of understanding the closed-off models as suitable
models of an intuitively acceptable truth predicate under some stress and alongside casts doubt
on KF as an acceptable theory of truth. However, reasoning within the non-classical logic of
the Kripkean fixed-points seems a non-trivial affaire or, as Feferman would have it, “nothing like
sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried on” in these non-classical logics (Feferman, 1984,
p. 95). Giving up on KF thus hardly seems a desirable conclusion.
In reaction to the counterintuitive consequences of KF, Reinhardt (1985, 1986) proposed an
instrumentalist interpretation of the theory in analogy to Hilbert’s program. Famously, Hilbert
proposed to justify number theory, analysis and even richer mathematical theories by finitary
means. Without entering into Hilbert-exegesis, the main idea was of course to provide con-
sistency proofs for these mathematical theories in a finitistically acceptable metatheory. From
a finitist perspective this would turn the mathematical theories into useful tools for producing
mathematical truths. But the fate of Hilbert’s program, at least on its standard interpretation, is
well known: Gödel’s incompleteness theorems are commonly thought to be the program’s coffin
nail. Nonetheless Reinhardt (1985, 1986) was optimistic that his program had greater chances
of success.2 Reinhardt proposed to view KF as a tool for deriving Kripkean truths in the same
way Hilbert viewed, say, number theory as a tool for deriving mathematical truths. A Kripkean
truth is a sentence that is true from the perspective of the Kripkean fixed-points: if KF ⊢ T pϕq
(T p¬ϕq), then ϕ is true (false) in all non-classical fixed-point models, that is, we are guaranteed
that ϕ receives a semantic value from the perspective of Kripke’s theory of truth. This is not a
general feature of the theorems of KF but peculiar to those sentences that KF proves true (false).
The latter sentences Reinhardt called “the significant part of KF” (Reinhardt, 1986, p. 219) and
labelled the set of KF-significant sentences KFS := {ϕ | KF ⊢ T pϕq}.3 In light of this terminology
the constitutive question of Reinhardt’s program is whether it was possible “to justify the use
of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences” (Reinhardt,
1986, p. 225)?
But what would such a successful instrumentalist interpretation of KF and the use of non-
significant sentences amount to? Reinhardt himself is scarce on the exact details, however, at
the end of Reinhardt (1985) he asks the following question:
If KF ⊢ T pϕq is there a KF-proof
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, T pϕq
such that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, KF ⊢ T pϕiq. (cf. Reinhardt, 1985, p. 239)4
If we can answer this question positively it seems that we can justify each Kripkean truth prov-
able in KF by appealing solely to the significant fragment of KF: even though we have reasoned in
KF, each step of our reasoning is part of KFS and hence “remains within the framework of signifi-
cant sentences”. This interpretation of Reinhardt’s program is adopted by Halbach and Horsten
2On p. 225 Reinhardt (1986) writes:
“I would like to suggest that the chances of success in this context, where the interpreted or significant
part of the language includes such powerful notations as truth, are somewhat better than in Hilbert’s
context, where the contentual part was very restictred.”
3KFS is sometimes also called the inner logic of KF (cf. Halbach and Horsten, 2006, p.638). We decided to
stick with Reimhardt’s original terminology.
4 To be precise, Reinhardt (1985) asked whether there was a KF-proof ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ϕ rather than a KF-proof
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, Tpϕq. But this presupposes that all true significant sentences are theorems of KF. While this is true
in the variants of KF Reinhardt considers, this is not the case in all versions of KF discussed in the literature.
However, all remarks concerning our version of the question generalize to Reinhardt’s original question.
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(2006) who called the question Reinhardt’s Problem. Unfortunately, as Halbach and Horsten
(2006) convincingly argue, if understood in this way the instrumentalist interpretation of KF will
fail. We refer to Halbach and Horsten (2006) for details but, in a nutshell, the reason for this
failure is that the truth-theoretic axioms of KF will not be true in the non-classical fixed-point
models and hence not be part of KFS, e.g., if ϕi := ∀x(Sent(x) → (T (x) ↔ T (¬.¬. x))),
5 then
ϕi 6∈ KFS. Indeed, Halbach and Horsten take this to show “that Reinhardt’s analogue of Hilbert’s
program suffers the same fate as Hilbert’s program” (Halbach and Horsten, 2006, p. 684).
However, we think that this conclusion is premature and argue that, to the contrary, if suitably
understood Reinhardt’s program can be deemed successful. Our key point of contention is that
Halbach and Horsten (2006), arguably following Reinhardt, employ the perspective of classical
logic when theorizing about the significant part of KF. But the logic of the significant part of KF
is not classical logic but the logic of the non-classical fixed-point models, that is, a non-classical
logic. This observation has two interrelated consequences for Reinhardt’s program. First, contra
Reinhardt, and Halbach and Horsten we should not identify the significant part of KF exclusively
with the set of significant sentences. Rather it also seems crucial to ask which inferences are
admissible within the significant part of KF. Of course, in classical logic this difference collapses
due to the deduction theorem but not so in non-classical logics. For example, the three-valued
logic Strong Kleene, K3, has no logical truth, but many valid inferences—if, in this case, we were
to focus only on the theorems of the logic, there would be no logic to discuss. Moreover, since
the significant sentences can be retrieved from the significant inferences, that is the provably
true inferences, we should focus on the latter rather than the former in addressing Reinhardt’s
Problem.6 To this end, it is helpful to conceive of KF as formulated in a two-sided sequent
calculus rather than a Hilbert-style axiomatic system. Let Γ,∆ be finite sets of sentences and
let T pΓq be short for {T pγq | γ ∈ Γ}. The admissible inferences of the significant part of KF,
which we label KFSI, can then be defined as follows:7
KFSI := {〈Γ,∆〉 | KF ⊢ T pΓq⇒ T p∆q}
Second, Reinhardt’s Problem, according to the formulation of Halbach and Horsten (2006),
which admittedly was inspired by Reinhardt’s (1985) original question, conceives of KF-proofs as
sequences of theorems of KF. But by focusing on sequences of theorems, we cannot fully exploit
the significant part of KF, that is, KFSI for precisely the reasons Halbach and Horsten (2006)
used to rebut Reinhardt’s program: while double negation introduction is clearly a member of
KFSI, if we wish to prove this fact by sequence of theorems, the proof would take us outside of
KFS since it would use the truth-theoretic axiom ∀x(Sent(x)→ (T (x)↔ T (¬.¬. x))), which is not
a member of the significant part of KF. This suggest a reformulation of Reinhard’s Problem
in terms of a notion of proof that focuses on inferences rather than theorems. To this end, it
proves useful again to formulate KF in a two-sided sequent calculus and to conceive of proofs as
derivation trees, where each node of the tree is labeled by a sequent. As a matter of fact in this
case we can distinguish between two versions Reinhard’s Problem:
1. For every KF-theorem of the form T pϕq, is there a KF-derivation tree with root ∅ ⇒ T pϕq
such that for every node d of the tree, d ∈ KFSI?
5 See §2 for details on notation.
6 The provable true sentences can be viewed as inferences where the truth of the sentence follows from an
empty hypothesis.
7 Notice that moving to a two-sided sequent formulation of KF is not essential. Due to the deduction theorem
we can also define KFSI be appeal to KF formulated in an axiomatic Hilbert-style calculus. In this case, the
definition would amount to
KFSI := {〈Γ,∆〉 | KF ⊢
∧
TpΓq →
∨
Tp∆q}.
3
2. For every KF-derivable sequent of the form T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q, is there a KF-derivation tree
with root T pΓq⇒ T p∆q such that for every node d of the tree, d ∈ KFSI?
The first question is a reformulation of Halbach and Horsten’s (2006) Reinhardt’s Prob-
lem. The second question, which we label Generalized Reinhardt Problem, asks whether
all provably true inferences can be justified by appealing to the significant inferences only. Ar-
guably, to deem Reinhardt’s program successful we need to give an affirmative answer to the
Generalized Reinhardt Problem. Otherwise, a proof of T pϕq could still rely on inferences
that, whilst part of KFSI, cannot themselves be justified by appealing only to the significant
inferences of KF. Perhaps surprisingly, we shall show that an affirmative answer to the Gener-
alized Reinhardt Problem can be given. It follows that on this more careful formulation
Reinhardt’s program can be deemed successful.
Arguably, one may still take issue with this conclusion and argue that our answer to the
Generalized Reinhardt Problem is at best a partial completion of Reinhardt’s program:
what is still required is an independent axiomatization of the significant part of KF, for this
would prove KF dispensable. We postpone a discussion of this view to the conclusion. Rather we
will now take a fresh look at the question of an independent axiomatization, which Halbach and
Horsten called Reinhardt’s Challenge (Halbach and Horsten, 2006, p. 689). This will prove
instrumental in answering the Generalized Reinhardt Problem. Reinhardt (1985) asked
for an independent axiomatization of the significant part of KF. More precisely, (Reinhardt, 1985,
p. 239) asked:
a) “Is there an axiomatization of {σ | KF ⊢ T pσq} which is natural and formulated entirely
within the domain of significant sentences,. . . .”
b) “Similarly for the relation Γ ⊢S σ defined by KF+ {T pγq | γ ∈ Γ} ⊢ T pσq.”
Halbach and Horsten (2006) proposed their theory Partial Kripke-Feferman (PKF) in way of
answering to Reinhardt’s Challenge. PKF is formulated in a non-classical, two-sided sequent
calculus and thus fits neatly with our observation that one should focus on the provably true
inferences of KF rather than the provably true sentences. Moreover, PKF is arguably a natural
axiomatization of Kripke’s theory of truth. However, Halbach and Horsten (2006) observed
that there are sentences ϕ such that KF ⊢ T pϕq but PKF 6⊢ ϕ, which led them to conclude that
Reinhardt’s Challenge cannot be met. The reason for this asymmetry is due to the difference
in proof-theoretic strength of KF and PKF: while KF proves transfinite induction for ordinals
below ε0, PKF only proves transfinite induction for ordinals smaller than ω
ω. As a consequence,
there will be arithmetical sentences that KF proves true that PKF cannot prove. The story does
not end there however. First, as Halbach and Nicolai (2018) observe, the discrepancy between
KF and PKF arises only if the rule of induction is extended beyond the arithmetical language,
that is, if we restrict induction to the language of arithmetic—call the resulting theories KF↾
and PKF↾—then KF↾ ⊢ T pϕq, if and only if, PKF↾ ⊢ ϕ. This highlights that the asymmetry
between KF and PKF is not due to the truth-specific principles but the amount of induction that
is assumed in the respective theories.
Second, corroborating the latter observation, Nicolai (2018) showed that the asymmetry be-
tween KF and PKF is indeed solely due to the amount of induction available within the respective
theories: Nicolai shows that if transfinite induction up to < ε0 is added axiomatically to PKF—
call this theory PKF+— then KF ⊢ T pϕq, if and only if, PKF+ ⊢ ϕ. Moreover, Nicolai (2018)
shows that independently of which version of induction is assumed in KF there will be a suitable
PKF-style theory, which will have exactly the provably true sentences of the relevant KF-style
theory as theorems. Nicolai took these results to “partially [accomplish] a variant of a program
sketched by Reinhardt” (cf. Nicolai, 2018, p. 103).
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However, the work by Halbach and Nicolai provides at best a positive answer to Question a),
it does not—at least not immediately—yield an answer to Question b). Indeed, it seems as if,
despite working in a non-classical, two-sided sequent calculus Halbach and Horsten (2006) have
largely neglected Question b) of Reinhardt’s Challenge and so have subsequent publications
on this issue. Indeed the version of PKF originally proposed by Halbach and Horsten (2006)
failed to yield a positive answer to Question b) for rather banal reasons—even for theories with
restricted induction: the version of KF Halbach and Horsten (2006) consider assumes the truth
predicate to be consistent, which, as we shall explain in due course, means that the logic of
KFSI is K3. But Halbach and Horsten formulate PKF in symmetric strong Kleene logic KS3
and as a consequence KF ⊢ T pϕq, T p¬ϕq ⇒ T pψq while PKF 6⊢ ϕ,¬ϕ⇒ ψ. The main technical
contribution of this paper is to clarify the situation and to show how, building on Nicolai’s (2018)
work, a positive answer to Question b) of Reinhardt’s Challenge can be provided. To this
end, we show how to pair the different variants of KF with a suitable PKF-style theory such
that the provable sequents of the latter theory constitute exactly the significant inferences of
the former theory. Moreover, it turns out that once we have an independent axiomatization of
KFSI, the Generalized Reinhardt Problem can be answered rather immediately: it is easy
to show that if a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ ∈ KFSI, then there will be a KF-derivation tree such that each
node of the tree can be derived in PKF+. But the provable sequents of PKF+ constitute exactly
the significant inferences of KF, that is, KFSI—every node of the KF-derivation is a member of
KFSI. The derivation remains within the significant part of KF.
1.1 Plan of the paper
We starting by fixing some basic terminology and notation. More specifically, Section 2 introduces
the language and the logical systems underlying PKF and its variants. That is, we introduce the
logics FDE, KS3, K3 and LP. In the next section, Section 3, we introduce the relevant families of
KF- and PKF-like theories and observe some basic properties of these PKF-systems. In Section
4 we prove the central technical results of this paper. We show that for each KF-like theory
we can find a PKF-counterpart such that the latter is an independent axiomatization of the
significant inference of the former. In other words, we show that the set of pairs 〈Γ,∆〉 such
that T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q is derivable in a KF-like theory coincides with the set of pairs 〈Γ,∆〉 such
that Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in a corresponding PKF-like theory. It turns out a positive answer to
Generalized Reinhardt Problem is but an immediate corollary of the existence of such an
independent axiomatization.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Language and notation
LT denotes the language of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA) extended by a unary predicate T .
LPA := LT \{T } is the T -free fragment of LT . Terms and formulae are generated in the usual
way. By an LT -expression we mean a term or a formula of LT . n is the numeral corresponding
to the number n ∈ ω; = is the formal identity symbol of LT . We fix a canonical Gödel numbering
of LT -expressions. If e is an LT -expression, the Gödel number (= gn) of e is denoted by #e
and peq is the term representing #e in LPA. We introduce some primitive recursive relations, in
practice working in a definitional extension of PA:
Term(x) (ClTerm(x)) := x is the gn of a (closed) term;
Var(x) := x is the gn of variable;
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Fmln(x) (Sent(x)) := x is the gn of a formula with at most n (0) free distinct variables;
Eq(x) := x is the gn of an equality between closed terms;
Ver(x) := x is the gn of true closed equality.
We also assume to have standard representations of the following primitive recursive operations
on Gödel numbers:
∨. : #ϕ,#ψ 7→ #(ϕ ∨ ψ) ¬. : #ϕ 7→ #(¬ϕ)
∧. : #ϕ,#ψ 7→ #(ϕ ∧ ψ) =. : #t,#s 7→ #(t = s)
∃. : #vk,#ϕ 7→ #(∃vkϕ) ∀. : #vk,#ϕ 7→ #(∀vkϕ)
T. : #t 7→ #T (t)
num : n 7→ #n (the gn of the n-th numeral) sub : #e,#t,#vk 7→ #e[t/vk]
e[t/vk] is the expression obtained from an expression e by replacing each free occurrence of vk by
a term t. We occasionally write e(t), when it is clear which variable is being substituted. We also
have a recursive function val(x) such that val(ptq) = t for closed terms t. We write ∃.a.b instead
of ∃. (a, b). We often abbreviate num(x) with x˙. We write ϕ(~v) to denote a formula ϕ whose free
variables are contained in ~v, and pϕ(x˙)q for sub(pϕ(v)q, num(x), pvq). This definition extends
to the case of multivaribales in the obvious way, and we write pϕ(~˙x)q for pϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)q. The
Gödelnumbering is canonical, so in particular we require that the following are provable in (a
fragment of) PA:
PA ⊢ val(x˙) = x ∧ ClTerm(x˙)
PA ⊢ Fml1(x)→ ∀zSent(x[z˙/v])
PA ⊢ ClTerm(x) ∧ ClTerm(y)→ (Ver(x=. y)↔ val(x) = val(y))
Terminology and notation for Gentzen-systems.
A sequent is a pair Γ ⇒ ∆ of finite sets of LT -formulae.8 For a finite set of formulae Γ(~x) :=
{ϕ1(~x), . . . , ϕn(~x)} with free variables contained in ~x, ¬Γ(~x) denotes the set of negated formulae
of Γ, i.e. {¬ϕ1(~x), . . . ,¬ϕn(~x)}, and
∧
Γ(~x) (
∨
Γ(~x)) denotes the iterated conjunction (disjunc-
tion) ϕ1(~x)∧ · · · ∧ϕn(~x) (ϕ1(~x)∨ · · · ∨ϕn(~x)). If Γ = ∅ we identify
∧
Γ with 0 = 0 and
∨
Γ with
¬(0 = 0). For t free for v in Γ (i.e. t is free for v for all members ϕ1, . . . , ϕn of Γ), we write Γ[t/v]
for {ϕ1[t/v], . . . , ϕn[t/v]}. For Γ a finite set of LT -sentences, we let T pΓq := {T pγq | γ ∈ Γ}.
A derivation of a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is a tree with nodes labelled by sequents. Given a derivation
D and a node Γ⇒ ∆ of D, call it d, we write Γ′|d|∆′ for Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′.
The height of a derivation D is the maximum lenght of the branches in the tree, where the lenght
of a branch is the number of its nodes minus 1.
In a rule of inference
• formulae in Γ,∆ are called side formulae, or context,
• the formulae not in the context in the conclusion are called principal formulae,
• the formulae in the premises from which the conclusion is derived (i.e. the formulae in the
premises not in the context) are called active formulae.
8 For simplicity we work with sets of formulae. A multiset version of the calculi below can be obtained adopting
the technique of repeating, whenever necessary, the principal formula in upper sequent, a device first introduced
by Kleene (1971) (see Negri et al. (2008)).
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Lastly, letting a literal be an atomic formula or the negation of an atomic formula, we define
Definition 2.1. The positive complexity of a formula ϕ, c(ϕ), is defined recursively in the fol-
lowing way:
• c(ϕ) = 0 for every literal ϕ;
• c(¬¬ϕ) = c(ϕ) + 1;
• c(ϕ ◦ ψ) = c(ϕ) + c(ψ) + 1, for ◦ = ∧,∨;
• c(¬(ϕ ◦ ψ)) = c(¬ϕ) + c(¬ψ) + 1, for ◦ = ∧,∨;
• c(Qvϕ) = c(ϕ(0)) + 1, for Q = ∃, ∀;
• c(¬Qvϕ) = c(¬ϕ(0)) + 1, for Q = ∃, ∀.
2.2 Sequent calculi for FDE and some of its extensions
In this section we introduce the various logics underlying the systems of truth employed in the
paper. We start with the two-sided sequent calculus of First Degree Entailment (FDE). For a
general overview of the different non-classical logics employed in this section see Priest (2008).
Definition 2.2 (FDE). The logic of FDE consists of the following axioms and rules.
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
(Cut)
(∨L)
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ ∨ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∨ ψ
(∨R)
(∧L)
ϕ, ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ ∧ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ∧ ψ
(∧R)
(∃L)
ϕ[u/v],Γ⇒ ∆
∃vϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[t/v]
Γ⇒ ∆, ∃viϕ
(∃R)
(∀L)
ϕ[t/v],Γ⇒ ∆
∀vϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ[u/v]
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀vϕ
(∀R)
(¬¬L)
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬¬ϕ
(¬¬R)
(¬∨L)
¬ϕ,¬ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ Γ⇒ ∆,¬ψ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)
(¬∨R)
(¬∧L)
¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ ¬ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ,¬ψ
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(¬∧R)
(¬∃L)
¬ϕ[t/v],Γ⇒ ∆
¬∃vϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ[u/v]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬∃vϕ
(¬∃R)
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(¬∀L)
¬ϕ[u/v],Γ⇒ ∆
¬∀vϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ[t/v]
Γ⇒ ∆,¬∀vϕ
(¬∀R)
Conditions of application: ϕ literal in initial sequents; u fresh variable.
Let
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
(¬L)
¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(¬R)
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ ¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(GG)
ψ,¬ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
Definition 2.3.
• Classical Logic, CL, is the system given by FDE + unrestricted (¬L) and (¬R).
• Strong Kleene, K3, is the system FDE + (¬L).
• Logic of Paradox, LP, is the system FDE + (¬R).
• Kleene’s Symmetric Logic, KS3, is the system FDE + (GG).9
Remark 2.4.
• It can easily be shown that FDE (KS3) and BDM (SDM), that is, the system(s) defined by
Nicolai (2018), are equivalent.
• As proved in the Appendix (Section A), KS3 in contrast to SDM enjoys a syntactic proof
of Cut elimination.
We now extend the base logics with rules for identity. Let
t = t,Γ⇒ ∆
(Ref)
Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ(t),Γ⇒ ∆ Γ⇒ ∆, s = t
(RepL)
ϕ(s),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) Γ⇒ ∆, s = t
(RepR)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(s)
for ϕ literal.
Definition 2.5.
• CL= is CL + (Ref) + (RepL)
• FDE= is FDE + (Ref) + (RepL).
• K3= is K3 + (Ref) + (RepL).
• LP= is LP + (Ref) + (RepR).
• KS3= is KS3 + (Ref) + (RepL).
Remark 2.6.
• (RepL) and (RepR) are equivalent over FDE, and they both yield the replacement schema
s = t, ϕ(s),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t)
• The reason for formulating K3= and KS3= with (RepL), and LP with (RepR) is to obtain
a syntactic proof of full Cut elimination. See Theorem Cut Elimination in the Appendix
for details.
9 For similar calculi defining the same logic see, for instance, Scott (1975) and Blamey (2002).
8
3 KF-like and PKF-like theories
This section introduces the KF-like and PKF-like truth theories. The theory Kripke-Feferman
KF was developed by Feferman (cf. Feferman, 1991) and further studied by, e.g., Reinhardt
(1986); McGee (1990) and Cantini (1989). The theory Partial Kripke-Feferman (PKF) may be
seen as the non-classical counterpart to KF. It was developed by Halbach and Horsten (2006)
and further studied by, e.g., Halbach and Nicolai (2018) and Nicolai (2018), who introduced the
theory PKF+.10
We first introduce different rules of induction employed in the formulation of the theories. To
this end we fix a standard notation system of ordinals up to Γ0.
11 We use a, b, c . . . to denote
the code of our notation system whose value is α, β, γ · · · ∈ On (with the exception of ω and
ε-numbers, for which we use the ordinals themselves), and we use ≺ to denote the p.r. ordering
defined on codes of ordinals. The expression ∀z ≺ y(ϕ[z/v]) is short for ∀z(¬(Ord(z)∧Ord(y)∧z ≺
y) ∨ ϕ[z/v]), where Ord represents the set of codes of ordinals. For α < Γ0 and a formula
ϕ(v) ∈ LT we let TI
<α(ϕ) denote
∀z ≺ y ϕ(z),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(y)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀x ≺ a ϕ(x)
(TI<α)
We have the following induction schemata (ϕ(v) ∈ LT ):
Γ, ϕ(u)⇒ ϕ(u′),∆
Γ, ϕ(0)⇒ ϕ(t),∆
u /∈ FV (Γ,∆, ϕ(0)) (IND)
Fml1(x), T x[y˙/v],Γ⇒ ∆, T x[y˙′/v]
Tx[num(0)/v],Γ⇒ ∆, T x[z˙/v]
(INDint)
where y is an eigenvariable and z is an arbitrary term.
We now introduce the basic truth principles employed in the systems of truth we discuss in
the paper.
Definition 3.1 (Truth Axioms). The following truth-theoretic initial sequents are called truth
axioms. Reg1-2 are called regularity axioms.12
(T =) ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y), val(x) = val(y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x=. y)
ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y), T (x=. y),Γ⇒ ∆, val(x) = val(y)
(T∨) Sent(x∨. y), T (x∨. y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x), T (y)
Sent(x∨. y), T (x) ∨ T (y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x∨. y)
(T∧) Sent(x∧. y), T (x∧. y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x) ∧ T (y)
Sent(x∧. y), T (x), T (y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x∧. y)
(T∃) Sent(∃. v.x), T (∃. v.x),Γ⇒ ∆, ∃zT (x[z˙/v])
Sent(∃. v.x), ∃zT (x[z˙/v]),Γ⇒ ∆, T (∃. v.x)
(T∀) Sent(∃. v.x), T (∀. v.x),Γ⇒ ∆, ∀zT (x[z˙/v])
Sent(∃. v.x), ∀zT (x[z˙/v]),Γ⇒ ∆, T (∀. v.x)
10See Halbach (2014) for a presentation and discussion of both theories.
11See for instance Feferman (1968), Pohlers (2009).
12 Regularity axioms were dropped in Feferman’s formulation of KF since they are derivable by (IND). They
were introduced by Cantini (1989) since they are not derivable in sytems withouth full induction for LT .
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(TT ) ClTerm(x), T (val(x)),Γ⇒ ∆, T (T. (x))
ClTerm(x), T (T. (x)),Γ⇒ ∆, T (val(x))
(T¬ =) ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y),¬
(
val(x) = val(y)
)
,Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. (x=. y))
ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y), T (¬. (x=. y)),Γ⇒ ∆,¬
(
val(x) = val(y)
)
(T¬¬) Sent(x), T (¬. ¬. x),Γ⇒ ∆, T (x)
Sent(x), T (x),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. ¬. x)
(T¬∨) Sent(x∨. y), T (¬. (x∨. y)),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. x) ∧ T (¬. y)
Sent(x∨. y), T (¬. x), T (¬. y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. (x∨. y))
(T¬∧) Sent(x∧. y), T¬. (x∧. y),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. x), T (¬. y)
Sent(x∧. y), T (¬. x) ∨ T (¬. y),Γ⇒ ∆, T¬. (x∧. y)
(T¬∃) Sent(∃. v.x), T (¬. ∃. v.x),Γ⇒ ∆, ∀zT (¬. x[z˙/v])
Sent(∃. v.x), ∀zT (¬. x[z˙/v]),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. ∃. v.x)
(T¬∀) Sent(∃. v.x), T (¬. ∀. v.x),Γ⇒ ∆, ∃zT (¬. x[z˙/v])
Sent(∃. v.x), ∃zT (¬. x[z˙/v]),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. ∀. v.x)
(T¬T ) ClTerm(x), T (¬. T. (x)),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. (val(x))) ∨ ¬Sent(val(x))
ClTerm(x), T (¬. (val(x))) ∨ ¬Sent(val(x)),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. T. (x))
(¬T¬)(i) Sent(x), T (¬. x),Γ⇒ ∆,¬T (x)
(ii) Sent(x),¬T (x),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. x)
(TSent) Tx,Γ⇒ ∆, Sent(x)
(Reg1) Var(z),ClTerm(y), Sent(∀. z.x), T x[y/z],Γ⇒ ∆, T x[
˙val(y)/z]13
(Reg2) Var(z),ClTerm(y), Sent(∀. z.x), T x[
˙val(y)/z],Γ⇒ ∆, T x[y/z]
The following definitions introduce the various KF- and PKF-style theories.
Definition 3.2 (KF). KF is obtained from CL= by adding sequents ⇒ ϕ for ϕ axiom of PA,
( IND), and all truth axioms of Df 3.1 except (¬T¬).
Definition 3.3 (KF-variants). We introduce variants of KF:
(i) KFcs is obtained from KF by adding Cons, i.e. Sent(x), T (¬. x),Γ⇒ ∆,¬T (x).
(ii) KFcp is obtained from KF by adding Comp, i.e. Sent(x),¬T (x),Γ⇒ ∆, T (¬. x).
14
(iii) KFS is obtained from KF by adding
Sent(x), Sent(y), T (x), T (¬. x),Γ⇒ ∆, T (y), T (¬. y) (GoG)
For Th = KF,KFcs,KFcp,KFS,
(iv) Th↾ is obtained from Th by restricting (IND) on LPA-formulae.
13Notice that ˙val(y) := num(val(y)).
14 Note that Cons is (¬T¬)(i) and Comp is (¬T¬)(ii). Of course, over the nonclassical logics studied in this
paper, (¬T¬) is not equivalent to Cons and Comp. (¬T¬) is just axiomatizing the well known property of fixed-
point models, according to which the anti-extension A can be defined via the extension E as A := {ϕ | ¬ϕ ∈ E}.
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(v) Thint is the theory obtained from Th↾ by replacing the restricted version of (IND) with
(IND
int
).
We move on to PKF-like theories.
Definition 3.4 (PKF). PKF is obtained from FDE= by adding sequents Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ and ¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
for ϕ axiom of PA, ( IND), truth axioms of Df. 3.1, and the following two rules requiring identity
statements to behave classically:15
Γ⇒ ∆, s = t
(= ¬L)
¬(s = t),Γ⇒ ∆
s = t,Γ⇒ ∆
(= ¬R)
Γ⇒ ∆,¬(s = t)
Definition 3.5 (PKF-cluster). We introduce variants of PKF
(i) PKFcs is obtained by adding (¬L) to PKF.
(ii) PKFcp is obtained by adding (¬R) to PKF.
(iii) PKFS is obtained by adding (GG) to PKF.
For Th = PKF,PKFcs,PKFcp,PKFS,
(iv) Th↾ is obtained from Th by restricting (IND) on LPA-formulae.
(v) Th+ is obtained by extending Th with (TI<ε0).
Since our formulation of PKF deviates to some extent from the formulation in Halbach and Horsten
(2006)—in contrast to Halbach and Horsten we do not assume contraposition—we now show that
PKF behaves classically on the T -free fragment of LT and that ψ(~x) and T pψ(~˙x)q are interderiv-
able.
Lemma 3.6. Let Th be one of the PKF-like theories introduced in Df. 3.5, ϕ ∈ LPA, and
ψ(~x) ∈ LT . Then
(i) Th ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ,¬ϕ and Th ⊢ ϕ,¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆;
(ii) Th ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ(~x) iff Th ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆, T pψ(~˙x)q;
(iii) Unrestricted (¬L) and (¬R) are admissible for ϕ ∈ LPA.
Proof. (i) and (ii) are shown by a straightforward induction on ϕ. For (iii), observe more generally
that, if ϕ,¬ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆ and Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ,¬ϕ are both derivable, then (¬L) and (¬R) are derived
rules
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(Cut)
¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ, ϕ ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(Cut)
Γ⇒ ∆,¬ϕ
Finally, to complete the picture we note that contraposition is admissible in PKF and PKFS.
15 Adding ¬ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆ for ϕ axiom of PA to PKF-like theories makes contraposition admissible in PKF and PKFS
(see Lemma 3.7).
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Lemma 3.7 (Contraposition). Contraposition, i.e. the rule
Γ⇒ ∆
¬∆⇒ ¬Γ
is admissible in PKF and PKFS.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the height of derivations. We show two crucial cases involving
the rules (GG) and (RepL). Suppose the derivation ends with
D0
ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
D1
¬ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
(GG)
ϕ,¬ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
We have
(i.h.)
¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ψ
(i.h.)
¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬¬ψ
(Inv16)
¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ψ
ϕ,¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ ¬ϕ,¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ
(GG)
ψ,¬ψ,¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ
(Cut)
¬ψ,¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ
(Cut)
¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ
(¬¬R)
¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ,¬¬ϕ
If the derivations ends with
D0
ϕ(t),Γ⇒ ∆
D1
Γ⇒ ∆, s = t
(RepL)
ϕ(s),Γ⇒ ∆
we reason as follows. We first derive
s = t,¬ϕ(s),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s) s = t,¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s), s = t
(RepL)
s = t,¬ϕ(t),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s)
(¬ =R)
¬ϕ(t),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s),¬(s = t)
(i.h.)
¬(s = t),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ
(Cut)
¬ϕ(t),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s)
We then apply (Cut) to the conclusion of the last derivation and the induction hypothesis we
obtain from D0
(i.h.)
¬∆⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(t) ¬ϕ(t),¬∆ ⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s)
(Cut)
¬∆⇒ ¬Γ,¬ϕ(s)
16 Notice that in PKF we have invertibility of (¬¬R).
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4 Reinhardt’s Challenge
In this section we address Reinhardt’s Challenge and show that given a KF-like theory there
is a corresponding PKF-like theory such that the set of inferences T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q provable in
the PKF-like theory coincides with the set of significant inferences of the KF-like theory. This
observation may be considered as a positive answer to Question b) discussed in the Introduction,
that is, as providing an independent axiomatization of the significant inferences of the KF-like
theories. Moreover, by axiomatizing the set of significant inferences of KF-like theories we obtain
a positive answer to the Generalized Reinhardt Problem as an immediate corollary. More
precisely, as shown in Proposition 4.26, every significant inference of a KF-like theory has a
significant derivation, i.e., whenever the theory proves T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q, we can find a derivation
D of T pΓq⇒ T p∆q such that every node of D is itself a significant inference.
To begin with define the notion of significant inferences for arbitrary truth theories.
Definition 4.1 (Significant Inferences). Let Th be an axiomatic truth-theory formulated in LT ,
and Γ,∆ be finite sets of LT -sentences. The set of significant inferences of Th is defined as
ThSI := {〈Γ,∆〉 | Th ⊢ T pΓq⇒ T p∆q}.17
Since the truth predicate of PKF-like theories is transparent (cf. Lemma 3.6(ii)) the significant
inferences of any PKF-like theory will simply amount to the set of provable inferences of the
theory. We also note in passing that the significant part of a truth theory (ThS) in the sense of
Reinhardt (1985, 1986), that is the provably true sentences of the theory, can be retrieved from
ThSI by setting
ThS := {ϕ ∈ Sent | 〈∅, ϕ〉 ∈ ThSI}.
Let us now show that for each KF-like theory there is a PKF-like theory such that the provable
sequents of the latter constitute exactly the significant inferences of the former.
Definition 4.2 (PKF◦,KF◦). The pair (PKF◦,KF◦) is a variable ranging over the following
theory-pairs
(PKF↾,KF↾), (PKFcs↾,KFcs↾), (PKFcp↾,KFcp↾), (PKFS↾,KFS↾)
(PKF,KFint), (PKFcs,KF
int
cs ), (PKFcp,KF
int
cp ), (PKFS,KF
int
S )
(PKF+,KF), (PKF+cs,KFcs), (PKF
+
cp,KFcp), (PKF
+
S ,KFS).
Moreover, let Th ∈ {KF,KFint,KF↾,PKF+,PKF↾}. Then Th⋆ ∈ {Th,ThS,Thcs,Thcp}.
We can now start proving the principal result of this section, i.e., we can prove that PKF◦ =
KFSI◦. We first show that PKF◦ ⊆ KFSI◦.
Proposition 4.3. Let (PKF◦,KF◦) as defined in Definition 4.2. Then
If PKF◦ ⊢ Γ(~x)⇒ ∆(~y), then KF◦ ⊢ T pΓ(~˙x)q ⇒ T p∆(~˙y)q.
Proposition 4.3 is essentially due to Halbach and Horsten (2006), Halbach and Nicolai (2018)
and Nicolai (2018), who proved the claim for theories without index cs or cp, that is, for pairs
of theories that do not assume the truth predicate to be consistent or complete. It thus suffices
to extend their result to these theories.
17Definition 4.1 can be viewed as an implementation of the definition of logical consequence, according to which
∆ is a consequence of Γ iff, if every sentence in Γ is true, then some sentence in ∆ is true. This also means that
that Definition 4.1 can be used as definition of inner logic of a truth-theory, as opposed to its inner theory, i.e.,
the set of provably true sentences.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3. The proof is straightforward.18 For pairs extended with a consistency
principle, it suffices to show that the KF-theory “internalizes” the soundness of (¬L). That is, it
suffices to show that, e.g., if KFcs ⊢ T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q, T pϕq, then KFcs ⊢ T p¬ϕq, T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q.
Symmetrically for theories extended with a completeness principle one needs to show that the
KF-theory “internalizes” the soundness of (¬R).
In light of the definition of KF◦SI, Proposition 4.3 immediately yields that the provable
inferences of PKF◦ are a subset KF◦SI:
Corollary 4.4. PKF◦ ⊆ KF◦SI.
4.1 From KF◦-significant inferences to PKF◦-provable sequents
The proof of the converse direction of Proposition 4.3 and Corollary 4.4 is more involved and
constitutes the main technical contribution of this article. The basic idea underlying the proof
is to show by an induction on the height of a KF◦-derivation that if KF◦ ⊢ T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q
then PKF◦ ⊢ T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q. However, KF◦-derivations may involve nodes Γ′ ⇒ ∆′, which are
acceptable from the perspective of classical logic but not in the non-classical logic underlying
PKF◦, i.e. they may involve nodes which are not significant. This obstacle is overcome by
showing by induction on the height of derivations that for every KF◦-provable sequent Γ ⇒ ∆,
the sequent Σ,Γ+ ∪∆− ⇒ Γ− ∪∆+,Σ is provable in PKF◦, where
Γ+ := {ϕ ∈ At | ¬2nϕ ∈ Γ} ∆+ := {ϕ ∈ At | ¬2nϕ ∈ ∆}
Γ− := {ϕ ∈ At | ¬2n+1ϕ ∈ Γ} ∆− := {ϕ ∈ At | ¬2n+1ϕ ∈ ∆}
Σ := Γ ∪∆− {ϕ | ϕ ∈ At}.19
This transformation is motivated by (i) the fact that identity behaves classically in PKF◦ and (ii)
the following semantic consideration: if a formula of the form ¬T t is classically false (true), then
T t is either true (false) or both (neither) from the perspective of the non-classical theory of truth.
As a consequence, moving T t in the succedent (antecedent) of the sequent will not interfere with
the validity of the sequent from the perspective of the non-classical logics at stake. Moreover,
if Γ ⇒ ∆ is of the form T pΓ′q ⇒ T p∆′q, that is Σ = ∅, the transformation leaves the sequent
unaltered—indeed this is the only interesting case of the transformation for otherwise the claim
follows from reflexivity and weakening in PKF◦. Hence, if we prove that for each KF◦-provable
sequent its transformation is PKF◦-provable, we obtain our desired result as a corollary.
As a matter of fact, we shall not implement this strategy using KF◦ but will take a detour via
KF-like theories formulated in Tait-style calculi, as these have nice proof-theoretic properties—for
example, they allow for partial cut-elimination—that facilitate the proof of our main results.
4.1.1 Tait-style KF
Tait-style calculi for KF-style theories where first given by Cantini (1989). To formulate KF as
Tait calculus the language LT needs to be modified. Negation will no longer be a primitive
symbol of the language and, as a consequence, formulae are built up from atomic and negated
atomic formulae by means of ∨,∧, ∃, ∀. Positive atoms have the form: t = s, T (t), and negative
18Notice that the use of rules for identity instead of identity axioms does not impact the arguments due to
Halbach and Horsten (2006), Halbach and Nicolai (2018) and Nicolai (2018).
19Notation: At is the set of atomic formulas of the language and ¬2nϕ (¬2n+1ϕ) with n ∈ ω denotes an atomic
formula ϕ with a prefix of an even (uneven) number of negation symbols.
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atoms are obtained by negating positive ones. An atom is simply a positive or a negative atom,
with the stipulation that
Definition 4.5. Negation ¬ satisfies ¬¬ϕ ≡ ϕ for ϕ atom, and for compound formulae it is
defined by De Morgan duality:
(i) ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ;
(ii) ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ) := ¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ;
(iii) ¬∀xϕ := ∃x¬ϕ;
(iv) ¬∃xϕ := ∀x¬ϕ
That is: If ϕ is an arbitrary formula, ¬ϕ is the formula which results from the negation
normal form of ¬ϕ by erasing each even sequence of occurrences of negation in front of atoms.
Definition 4.6. The complexity of a formula, c(ϕ), is inductively defined by:
(a) c(ϕ) = 0 if ϕ is at atom;
(b) c(ϕ ◦ ψ) = max(c(ϕ), c(ψ)) + 1 (◦ = ∧,∨)
(c) Qxϕ = c(ϕ[0/x]) + 1 (Q = ∃, ∀)
Definition 4.7 (TKFint). The system TKFint consists of
4.9.1 Logical axioms:
L.1 Γ, ϕ,¬ϕ;
L.2 Γ,¬(t = s),¬ϕ[t/v], ϕ[s/v];
L.3 Γ, t = t; Γ,¬(t = s), s = t; Γ,¬(t = s),¬(s = r), t = r.
where ϕ is an atom.
4.9.2 Arithmetical axioms:
A.1 the successor axioms Γ,¬(t′ = 0) and Γ,¬(t′ = s′), t = s.
A.2 sequents of the form Γ, E where E is a defining equation for a function symbol of
LT .
4.9.3 The following special T -axioms:
T .1 Γ,¬ClTerm(x),¬ClTerm(y),¬T (x=. y), val(x) = val(y);
T .2 Γ,¬ClTerm(x),¬ClTerm(y),¬T (¬. (x=. y)),¬(val(x) = val(y));
T .3 Γ,¬ClTerm(x),¬ClTerm(y),¬(val(x) = val(y)), T (x=. y);
T .4 Γ,¬ClTerm(x),¬ClTerm(y), val(x) = val(y), T (¬. (x=. y));
T .5 Γ,¬T (x), Sent(x);
T .6 Γ,¬Var(z),¬ClTerm(y),¬Sent(∀. z.x),¬T (x[
˙val(y)/v]), T (x[y/v]);
T .7 Γ,¬Var(z),¬ClTerm(y),¬Sent(∀. z.x),¬T (x[y/v]), T (x[
˙val(y)/v]).
4.9.4 Standard rules of inference for ∨,∧, ∃, ∀, and the cut-rule (see for instance Schwichtenberg and Wainer
(2011, §1.5)).
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4.9.5 The special T -rules:
(T rp)
Γ, (¬)T (x)
Γ, (¬)TpT (x˙)q
Γ,Sent(x) Γ, (¬)Tx
Γ, (¬)T (¬. ¬. x)
(¬Tdn)
(Tnrp)
Γ, T (¬. x),¬Sent(x)
Γ, T (¬. pT (x˙)q)
Γ,¬T (¬. x) Γ,¬Sent(x)
Γ,¬T (¬. pT (x˙)q)
(¬Tnrp)
(Tand)
Γ, Sent(x∧. y) Γ, (¬)(Tx ∧ Ty)
Γ, (¬)T (x∧. y)
Γ, Sent(x∧. y) Γ, (¬)(T (¬. x) ∨ T (¬. y))
Γ, T (¬. (x∧. y))
(Tnand)
(Tor)
Γ,Sent(x∨. y) Γ, (¬)(Tx ∨ Ty)
Γ, (¬)T (x∨. y)
Γ,Sent(x∨. y) Γ, (¬)(T (¬. x) ∧ T (¬. y))
Γ, (¬)T (¬. (x∨. y))
(Tnor)
(Tall)
Γ,Sent(∀. v.x) Γ, ∀yT (x[y˙/v])
Γ, T (∀. v.x)
Γ,Sent(∀. v.x) Γ, (¬)∃yT (¬. x[y˙/v])
Γ, (¬)T (¬. ∀. v.x)
(Tnall)
(T ex)
Γ, Sent(∃. v.x) Γ, (¬)∃yT (x[y˙/v])
Γ, (¬)T (∃. v.x)
Γ, Sent(∃. v.x) Γ, (¬)∀yT (¬. x[y˙/v])
Γ, (¬)T (¬. ∃. v.x)
(Tnex)
(T ind)
Γ,Fml1(x) Γ, Tx[num(0)/v] Γ, ∀y(T (x[y˙/v]) → T (x[y˙′/v]))
Γ, T (x[z˙/v])
z arbitrary
As before, we shall not only consider the system TKFint but several variants thereof. The
following definitions introduce the different versions of TKF-systems.
Definition 4.8. TKFintcs ,TKF
int
cp ,TKF
int
S are obtained by adding to TKF
int the following axioms,
respectively:
TCons Γ,¬Sent(x),¬T (x),¬T (¬. x)
TComp Γ,¬Sent(x), T (x), T (¬. x)
TGG Γ,¬Sent(x),¬Sent(y),¬T (x),¬T (¬. x), T (y), T (¬. y)
Definition 4.9 (TKF,TKF↾). Let Thint ∈ {TKFintcs ,TKF
int
cp ,TKF
int
S ,TKF
int}. Then
• Th is the theory obtained from Thint by replacing the rule (T ind) with full induction
Γ, ϕ(0) Γ, ∀y(ϕ(y)→ ϕ(y′))
(TIND)
Γ, ∀vϕ
for arbitrary ϕ(v) ∈ LT .
• Th↾ is obtained from Thint by replacing (T ind) with the rule
Γ, ϕ(0) Γ, ∀y(ϕ(y)→ ϕ(y′))
(TIND↾)
Γ, ∀vϕ
ϕ ∈ LPA
Finally, let Th ∈ {TKF,TKFint,TKF↾}, then Th⋆ ∈ {Th,ThS,Thcs,Thcp}.
Fact 4.10. TKF⋆↾ is contained in the subtheory TKF
int
⋆ ↾ of TKF
int
⋆ , obtained by allowing T ind
only in the following restricted version:
Γ,FmlLPA(x) Γ, T x[num(0)/v] Γ, ∀y(Tx[y˙/v]→ Tx[y˙
′/v]
(T ind↾ LPA)
Γ, ∀vϕ
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TKFint⋆ derivations are locally correct (relative to axioms and rules of Dfs. 4.7, 4.8) finite trees,
dressed with sequents. The height of a derivation tree D is its ordinal rank; the cut rank of a
formula which is eliminated in a cut-rule is the complexity of the formula. The supremum of the
cut ranks of D is called the cut rank of D. D is quasi-normal if D has cut rank 0. The relation
TKFint⋆ ⊢
n
l Γ expresses that Γ is derivable in TKF
int
⋆ with a proof of finite length ≤ n and a cut
rank ≤ l. This relation can be canonically represented in arithmetic via a recursively enumerable
predicate BewTKFint
⋆
(n, l, pΓq).
For our aim it is crucial that every TKFint⋆ -derivation can be transformed into a quasi-normal
derivation, which is the content of the following proposition.
Proposition 4.11 (Cantini, 1989). Every TKFint⋆ -derivation D can be effectively transformed
into a quasi-normal derivation D′ with the same end sequent.
The last proposition can be formalized in PA:
Lemma 4.12. Let 2x0 := x and 2
x
n+1 := 2
2x
n . Then
PA ⊢ BewTKFint
⋆
(y, u, pΓq)→ BewTKFint
⋆
(2yu, 0, pΓq)
Proposition 4.13 (Hp-Inversion).
• If TKFint⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ, then TKFint⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ϕ, ψ.
• If TKFint⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, then TKF
int
⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ϕi for i ∈ {1, 0}.
• If TKFint⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ∀vϕ, then TKFint⋆ ⊢
n Γ, ϕ[u/v] for any u /∈ FV (Γ, ϕ).
Proof. By induction on the height of derivations. The key observation is that every axiom of
TKFint⋆ has the form Γ,∆, where ∆ contains (possibly one) active formulae, and that every active
formula of a given axiom has complexity zero.
The various KF-like theories can be embedded in corresponding TKF-systems, which is of
course crucial for our purpose.
Lemma 4.14 (KF-embedding). For all ⋆, let (KF◦,TKF◦) range over the following pairs of
theories
(KF⋆↾,TKF
int
⋆ ↾), (KF
int
⋆ ,TKF
int
⋆ ), (KF⋆,TKF⋆).
Then under the obvious translation of the language of KF into the Tait framework
KF◦ ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆ implies TKF◦ ⊢ ¬Γ,∆.
4.1.2 From Tait-style KF◦ to PKF◦-provable sequents
We can now show how to transform Tait-style KF-provable sequents into sequents that are prov-
able in a suitable PKF-system. To begin with, we show how to turn TKFint⋆ -derivations into
PKF⋆-derivations. The idea is basically the one sketched at the beginning of Section 4.1 modified
to account for the fact that Tait-style systems are one-sided rather than two-sided.
Lemma 4.15 (Main Lemma). Let Γ ⊆ LT and
ΓAt
+
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ positive atom} ΓAt := ΓAt
+
∪ ΓAt
−
ΓAt
−
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ negative atom} Γ↾ := Γ\ΓAt
Then for all ⋆
TKFint⋆ ⊢ Γ implies PKF⋆ ⊢ Γ↾,¬Γ
At− ⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾ .
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Proof of Main Lemma. The proof is by a cumbersome, yet unsurprising, induction on the height
of a quasi-normal TKFint⋆ -derivation. For this reason we only highlight a few cases in the main
body of the paper.
n = 0 The case where Γ is a logical or an arithmetical axiom is the same for all theories PKF⋆.
For example,
L.1 If Γ is of the form Γ′, ϕ,¬ϕ for ϕ atom, then the conclusion, in each case, follows by
weakening on ϕ,¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, ϕ.
All T -axioms are proven analogously. We show a few examples.
T.2 We reason in PKF⋆, omitting Γ
′↾,¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
,Γ′↾ for readability:
ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y), T¬. (x=. y)⇒ ¬(val(x) = val(y))
(Lemma 3.6(iii))
ClTerm(x),ClTerm(y), T¬. (x=. y), val(x) = val(y)⇒
T.6 and T.7 The regularity axioms are derivable by (IND).
TCons,TCons,TGG As for the specific TKFint⋆ -axioms, we want to show
PKFcp ⊢ Sent(x)⇒ T (x), T (¬. x) (1)
PKFcs ⊢ Sent(x), T (x), T (¬. x)⇒ (2)
PKFS ⊢ Sent(x), Sent(y), T (x), T (¬. x)⇒ T (y), T (¬. y) (3)
For (1)
Sent(x),¬T (x) ⇒ T (¬. x)
(¬R)
Sent(x) ⇒ T (¬. x),¬¬T (x)
Sent(x), T (x) ⇒ T (x)
(¬¬L)
Sent(x),¬¬T (x) ⇒ T (x)
(Cut)
Sent(x) ⇒ T (x), T (¬. x)
For (2) we have
Sent(x), T (x) ⇒ T (x)
(¬L)
Sent(x), T (x),¬T (x) ⇒ Sent(x), T (¬. x) ⇒ ¬T (x)
(Cut)
Sent(x), T (x), T (¬. x) ⇒
Finally, for (3)
Sent(x), Sent(y), T (y) ⇒ , T (y)¬T (y) Sent(x), Sent(y),¬T (y) ⇒ T (y),¬T (y)
(GG)
Sent(x), Sent(y), T (x),¬T (x) ⇒ T (y),¬T (y)
(¬T¬)
Sent(x), Sent(y), T (x), T (¬. x) ⇒ T (y), T (¬. y)
n > 0 The logical rules follow trivially from reflexivity and weakening. It remains to deal with
Cut, the T -rules and induction.
Cut For this to work it is crucial that we are dealing with quasi-normal derivations. In this
case the Cut-rule is applied to atoms only and we can just apply (Cut) in PKF⋆:
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(i.h.)
Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾, ϕ
(i.h.)
ϕ,Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾
(Cut)
Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾
Finally, we show some relevant examples for T -rules, exploiting (sometimes implicitly) inversion
(see Proposition 4.13).
Tnor Suppose the derivation of Γ ends with
⊢n
′
Γ′, Sent(x∨. y) ⊢
n′ Γ′, T (¬. x) ∧ T (¬. y)
(Tnor)
⊢n Γ′, T (¬. (x∨. y))
where n′ < n. In PKF⋆ (using inversion and i.h.)
¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (¬. x) ¬Γ
′At− ⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (¬. y)
(∧R)
¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (¬. x) ∧ T (¬. y)
(T¬∨)
¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (¬. (x∨. y))
¬Tnall Suppose the derivation of Γ ends with
⊢n
′
Γ′, Sent(∀.v.x) ⊢
n′ Γ′,¬T (¬. x[u˙/v])
(Tnall)
⊢n Γ′,¬T (¬. ∀.v.x)
with u eigenparameter. In PKF⋆
T (¬. x[u˙/v])¬Γ
′At− ⇒ Γ′At
+
(∃L)
∃yT (¬. x[y˙/v])¬Γ
′At− ⇒ Γ′At
+
(T¬∀)
T (¬. ∀.v.x),¬Γ
′At− ⇒ Γ′At
+
T ind Suppose the TKFint⋆ -derivation ends with an application of (T ind):
⊢n
′
Γ′,Fml1(x) ⊢n
′
Γ′, T (¬x[num(0)/v]) ⊢n
′
Γ′, ∀y(T (x[y˙/v])→ T (x[y˙′/v]))
(T ind)
⊢n Γ′, T (x[z˙/v])
From the right most premise we obtain by inversion
⊢n
′
Γ′,¬T (x[u˙/v]), T (x[u˙′/v])
for u /∈ FV (Γ, T x[z˙/v]). Choose u /∈ FV (Tx[num(0)/v])); then we reason in PKF⋆
T (x[u˙/v]),¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (x[u˙′/v])
(IND)
Tx[num0/v],¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (x[z˙/v]) ¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (x[num0/v])
(Cut)
¬Γ′At
−
⇒ Γ′At
+
, T (x[z˙/v])
By inspecting the proof of the Main Lemma it is immediate that we can lift the lemma to
the pair TKFint⋆ ↾ and PKF⋆↾, that is, we obtain the following
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Corollary 4.16. Let Γ ⊆ LT and
ΓAt
+
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ positive atom} ΓAt := ΓAt
+
∪ ΓAt
−
ΓAt
−
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ negative atom} Γ↾ := Γ\ΓAt
Then for all ⋆
TKFint⋆ ↾⊢ Γ implies PKF⋆↾⊢ Γ↾,¬Γ
At− ⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾ .
We also note that the Main Lemma can be formalized in PKF, which will prove important
when we consider TKF-systems with full induction.
Corollary 4.17. Let Γ ⊆ LT and
ΓAt
+
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ positive atom} ΓAt := ΓAt
+
∪ ΓAt
−
ΓAt
−
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ negative atom} Γ↾ := Γ\ΓAt
Then for all ⋆
PKF⋆ ⊢ BewTKFint
⋆
(n, 0, pΓq) implies PKF⋆ ⊢ Γ↾,¬Γ
At− ⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾ .
We have shown how to transform provable sequents in TKF-systems with restricted or internal
induction into provable sequents of appropriate PKF-like theories. It remains to show the claim
for TKF-like theories with full induction. Since derivations in TKF-systems with full induction can
no longer be transformed into quasi-normal derivation we have to take a detour via the infinitary
system TKF∞, which enjoys partial cut-elimination. The key observation that makes this detour
possible is that for TKF∞ quasi-normal derivations up to height ε0 the strategy employed in
our Main lemma (Lemma 4.15) can be used to provide suitable PKF+-derivations. This proves
sufficient for lifting Lemma 4.15 to the TKF-theories with full induction. The technique for
embedding TKF in TKF∞ is well known (see, e.g., Schwichtenberg and Wainer, 2011, §4.3.2).
For the sake of completeness, we give a succinct presentation of TKF∞.
Definition 4.18. The language of TKF∞ is obtained by omitting free variables from the language
of TKF. TKF∞-axioms include logical axioms 4.9.1, arithmetical axioms 4.9.2, and special T -
axioms 4.9.3 (formulated in the new language); alternatively, arithmetical axioms can be replaced
by the set of all sequents of the form
Γ, t = s if N |= t = s,
Γ,¬(t = s) if N |= ¬(t = s).
TKF∞-inference rules include all rules of TKF except (IND) and (∀). Additionally, the following
infinitary rule (ω) is allowed:
Γ, ϕ[t/v] for all closed terms t
Γ, ∀vϕ
(ω)
TKF∞-derivations, due to (ω), are possibly infinite. Notions about derivations introduced
above, including height and cut rank, carry over without modifications. In particular, TKF∞-
derivations are well-founded trees, where at each node there is either the root, or instances of
axioms, or there is a 1-fold branching (corresponding to unary rules), or a two fold branching
(corresponding to binary rules), or an ω-fold branching (corresponding to the ω-rule).
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Proposition 4.19 (Inversion).
• If TKF∞⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ, then TKF∞⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ϕ, ψ.
• If TKF∞⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1, then TKF
∞
⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ϕi for i ∈ {1, 0}.
• If TKF∞⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ∀vϕ, then TKF∞⋆ ⊢
α Γ, ϕ(t) for any closed term t.
Proof. By induction on the height of derivations.
Every TKF-derivation can be transformed into a TKF∞-derivation with height < ω2 and finite
cut rank. Every TKF∞-derivation of height α < ε0 and cut rank m can be transformed into a
quasi-normal derivation of height ϕm0 α, where ϕ
m
0 α stands form iterations of the Veblen function
ϕ0 on α.
20 We can thus restrict our attention to TKF∞-derivations of finite cut rank and length
< ε0. These derivations can be primitive recursively encoded by natural numbers, and the codes
will contain information about the derivation.21 In particular, if u codes a derivation D we can
primitive recursively read off from u a bound for the length of D and a bound for its cut rank;
additionally, we can read off the name of: the last inference, its principal/side formulae and
its conclusion. This enables us to find a predicate, say Bew∞(a, r, pΓq), expressing the relation
TKF∞ ⊢αρ Γ, i.e., Γ is derivable in TKF
∞ with a derivation of length ≤ α and cut rank ≤ ρ. Due
to the amount of transfinite induction available in PKF+ the embedding of TKF⋆ in TKF
∞
⋆ and
partial cut-elimination for TKF∞⋆ can be formalized in PKF
+.
Lemma 4.20. Let Γ ⊆ LT . Then for all ⋆
(i) For all n, r ∈ ω, PKF+⋆ ⊢ BewTKF⋆(n, r, pΓq)→ Bew∞(ω
2, r, pΓq).22
(ii) For α < ε0,PKF
+
⋆ ⊢ Bew∞(a, r, pΓq)→ Bew∞(ϕ
r
0a, 0, pΓq).
Lemma 4.21. Let Γ ⊆ LT and
ΓAt
+
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ positive atom} ΓAt := ΓAt
+
∪ ΓAt
−
ΓAt
−
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ negative atom} Γ↾ := Γ\ΓAt
Then for all ⋆ and α < ε0,
PKF+⋆ ⊢ Bew∞(a, 0, pΓq) implies PKF
+
⋆ ⊢ Γ↾,¬Γ
At− ⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾ .
Proof. The proof is by transfinite induction on α < ε0 and to large extents a formalization of
the proof of Lemma 4.15. If α = 0 it suffices indeed to formalize the proof of Lemma 4.15. The
case where α is a limit ordinal involves an application of (ω). This means that Γ↾ is non-empty
and the claim follows trivially by reflexivity and weakening in PKF+. For the successor case the
crucial cases are the T -rules involving quantifiers, as the remaining case are again immediate by
formalizing the proof of Lemma 4.15. We discuss (T all)—(the other rules can be treated along
the same lines—where the height of the derivation is a successor ordinal α and the induction
hypothesis holds for β < α.
⊢β Γ, Sent(∀.v.s) ⊢
β Γ, ∀yT (s[y˙/v])
(Tall)
⊢α Γ, T (∀.v.s)
20 Recall the well-known identities ϕ0α = ωα and ϕ10 = ε0.
21See Schwichtenberg (1977, §4.2.2) for details.
22For sake of readability we omit ⋆-index for the TKF∞ theories and write Bew∞ instead of BewTKF∞. The
index at stake should be clear from context.
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By inversion on the right premise we get, for all closed terms t
TKF∞ ⊢β Γ, T (s[num(t)/v]).
This can be formalized within PKF+, that is, by induction hypothesis we obtain
PKF+ ⊢ ∀y(¬ClTerm(y) ∨ Bew∞(b, 0, pΓ, T (s[y˙/v])q))
Now, let u be an eigenparameter and recall that PA ⊢ ClTerm(x˙). Then23
(PA)
⇒ Bew∞(b, 0, pΓ, T (s[u˙/v])q),ClTerm(u˙)
⇒ ¬ClTerm(u˙),Bew∞(b, 0, pΓ, T (s[u˙/v])q)
(Lemma 3.6(iii))
¬ClTerm(u˙)⇒ Bew∞(b, 0, pΓ, T (s[u˙/v])q)
(Cut)
⇒ Bew∞(b, 0, pΓ, T (s[u˙/v])q)
We apply the induction hypothesis and reason in PKF+⋆ as follows
(i.h.)
Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾, T (s[u˙/v])
(∀R)
Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾, ∀yT (s[y˙/v])
(T∀)
Γ↾,¬ΓAt
−
⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾, T (∀.v.s)
Since, as mentioned, TKF⋆ can be embedded in TKF
∞ without exceeding quasi-normal deriva-
tion of length < ε0, we obtain:
Corollary 4.22. Let Γ ⊆ LT and
ΓAt
+
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ positive atom} ΓAt := ΓAt
+
∪ ΓAt
−
ΓAt
−
:= {ϕ ∈ Γ | ϕ negative atom} Γ↾ := Γ\ΓAt
Then for all ⋆
TKF⋆ ⊢ Γ implies PKF
+
⋆ ⊢ Γ↾,¬Γ
At− ⇒ ΓAt
+
,Γ↾ .
We have now shown how to transform provable sequents of TKF-systems into sequents prov-
able in appropriate PKF-like theories. In virtue of Lemma 4.14 this immediately yields that the
set of significant inferences of KF-like theories is contained in the set of provable sequents of
appropriate PKF-like theories.
Lemma 4.23. KF◦SI ⊆ PKF◦
Proof. If KF◦ ⊢ T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q, then by Lemma 4.14 TKF◦ ⊢ ¬T pΓq, T p∆q, hence PKF◦ ⊢
T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q by Lemma 4.15 and Corollaries 4.16, 4.22. But the truth predicate of PKF◦ is
transparent and thus PKF◦ ⊢ Γ⇒ ∆.
Lemma 4.23 in combination with Corollary 4.4 show that PKF◦ yields precisely the significant
sentence of KF◦. In other words we have answered Question b) of Reinhardt’s Challenge.
Proposition 4.24 (Reinhardt’s Challenge). PKF◦ = KF◦SI.
23Notice that PKF+ ⊢ ∀vϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) for arbitrary t.
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Before we turn our attention to the Generalized Reinhardt Problem we point out that
answer to Reinhardt’s Question b) yields an answer to Question a) as a corollary.24
Corollary 4.25. {ϕ ∈ SentLT | PKF
◦ ⊢ ϕ} = KF◦S.
4.2 Generalized Reinhard Problem
In this paper we promised to give a positive answer to the Generalized Reinhardt Problem,
that is, the question whether for any pair 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ KF◦SI there is a KF◦-derivation such that
each node of the derivation tree is a member of KF◦SI. It is now time to make good on our
promise. Making essential use of Proposition 4.24 we show that if 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ KF◦SI, then there
is a KF◦-derivation such that each node of the derivation tree is a PKF◦-provable sequent. This
implies the desired conclusion in virtue of Proposition 4.24.
Proposition 4.26 (Generalized Reinhardt Problem). If 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ KF◦SI, then there is a
KF◦-derivation D of Γ⇒ ∆ such that for each node d of D, d ∈ KF◦SI.
Proof. If 〈Γ,∆〉 ∈ KF◦SI, then by Proposition 4.24 PKF◦ ⊢ Γ ⇒ ∆ and hence PKF◦ ⊢ T pΓq ⇒
T p∆q. Now let D′ be an arbitrary KFint⋆ -derivation of T pΓq⇒ T p∆q, e.g.
δ0
Γ4 ⇒ ∆4
δ2
Γ2 ⇒ ∆2
δ1
Γ3 ⇒ ∆3
δ3
Γ1 ⇒ ∆1
(R)
T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q
Let d0 . . . dk−1 be the nodes of D′. In order to obtain D, it suffices to replace each di with
T pΓq|di|T p∆q, i.e.:
δ0
T pΓq,Γ4 ⇒ ∆4, T p∆q
δ2
T pΓq,Γ2 ⇒ ∆2, T p∆q
δ1
T pΓq,Γ3 ⇒ ∆3, T p∆q
δ3
T pΓq,Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, T p∆q
(R)
T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q
Since KF◦ is closed under weakening, D is a KF◦-derivation of T pΓq ⇒ T p∆q. But every node
T pΓq,Γi ⇒ ∆i, T p∆q of D is derivable in PKF
◦ = KF◦SI.
24Recall that the results proven by Halbach and Horsten (2006), Halbach and Nicolai (2018), and Nicolai (2018)
only addressed Question a) and our observations should be viewed as a generalization of their results. This also
means that our results provide a neat novel strategy for determining the proof-theoretic strength of PKF-like
theories.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we had a fresh look at Reinhardt’s program and proposed to focus on the provably
true inferences of KF-like theories rather than the provably true sentences only. We showed that
if we conceive of the significant part of KF-like theories as the set of provably true inferences
then we can remain within the significant part of the theory in proving its significant inferences.
This answers the Generalized Reinhardt Problem and also shows that we need not step
outside the significant part of KF in proving theorems of the form T pϕq, which was the content
of the original formulation of Reinhardt’s Problem. From the perspective of KF-derivations
the use of the nonsignificant part of KF is hence dispensable and in this sense an instrumentalist
interpretation of KF is certainly available. However, should we conclude that we have justified
the use of nonsignificant sentences entirely within the framework of significant sentences?
One may think that to answer the latter question affirmatively an independent characteriza-
tion of the significant part of KF needs to be provided and this is precisely the content of Rein-
hardt’s challenge. Building on results by Halbach and Horsten (2006); Halbach and Nicolai
(2018) and Nicolai (2018) we have shown how to provide axiomatizations of the significant part
of KF-like theories in non-classical logic. The only remaining question is whether these axioma-
tizations are fully independent. We take it that there is no doubt in this respect concerning the
axiomatizations of the significant part of KF-like theories with internal or restricted induction.
Turning to KF-like theories with full induction the crucial question is whether the rule (TI<ε0)
is available from within the significant framework. Ultimately, an answer to this question will
depend on the role the theory of truth is supposed to play within one’s theoretical framework. If,
for instance, one takes the theory to play an important role in the foundations of mathematics
and, for instance, to play a role in singling out the limits of predicativity (cf. Feferman, 1991),
then one should arguably refrain from thinking that (TI<ε0) can be assumed without further
justification from within the significant framework. But, to the contrary, if the theory of truth
is to play no role in the foundations of mathematics and classical mathematical theorizing is
freely available from within the significant framework, then it is hard to see why (TI<ε0) should
not be considered as fully justified from within the significant perspective. In this case it would
seem that Reinhardt’s program needs to be deemed successful. However, a proper philosophi-
cal assessment of the rule of transfinite induction up to ε0 from the perspective of Reinhardt’s
program is beyond the scope of the paper. Nonetheless, as we hope to have established in this
paper—contra Halbach and Horsten (2006) and Halbach and Nicolai (2018)—there is no major
technical obstacle preventing the success of Reinhardt’s program and, in this sense, Reinhardt
was certainly right in claiming that “the chances of success in this context (. . . ) are somewhat
better than in Hilbert’s context” (Reinhardt, 1986, p.225).
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A Cut-elimination
We show that Cut elimination holds for the sequent calculi introduced above.
Theorem A.1 (Cut Elimination). Cut elimination holds for FDE=,K3=, LP= and KS3=.
Proof. The proof strategy is standard (see e.g. Negri et al. (2008), Troelstra and Schwichtenberg
(2000)): reasoning by primary induction on the complexity of the cut formula ϕ and by subin-
duction on the cut-height (= sum of heights of the derivations of the premises of Cut), we provide
an algorithmic procedure to eliminate applications of Cut, by showing either how to permute
cuts upwards or how to reduce the complexity of the cut formula. Cuts are permuted up until
one of the premises is an initial sequent. The key observation in the proof to follow is that the
calculi are designed so that if the cut formula is principal in both premises of Cut, then the
complexity of ϕ is >0, i.e. ϕ cannot be a literal.
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. One of the premises is an axiom. If Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ is an axiom then either Γ and
∆ share a literal, in which case Γ′,Γ ⇒ ∆,∆′ is an axiom, or ϕ ∈ Γ, in which case we derive
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′ from the right premise by weakening. If ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′ is an axiom, then the argument
is symmetrical.
Case 2. No premises is an axiom. We distinguish two subcases:
2.1. The cut formula ϕ is not principal in the derivation of Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ. We adapt a com-
pact argument by Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, p. 96) to the present context, showing
how to permute a cut upwards over the rule R used to derive Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ.25 For example, for R
say a two-premise rule we have
D0
Γi ⇒ ∆i, ϕ
D1
Γj ⇒ ∆j , ϕ
(R)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
D2
ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
We transform this into
D0
Γi ⇒ ∆i, ϕ
D2
ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
Γi,Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′,∆i
D1
Γj ⇒ ∆j , ϕ
D2
ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
Γj ,Γ
′ ⇒ ∆′,∆j
(R)
Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
2.2. The cut formula ϕ is not principal in the derivation of ϕ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′. The argument
is symmetrical to 2.1. For the sake of concreteness, we show by way of example how to apply
the method described above to the crucial rule GG. Suppose the derivation ends with
D0
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
D1
ϕ, ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
D2
ϕ,¬ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(GG)
ϕ, ξ,¬ξ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
ξ,¬ξ,Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
25 Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000) work with multisets and in their argument they additionally invoke
the closure under contraction of the various systems they analyze. Moreover, they work with a context-sharing
version of Cut, also called additive Cut, i.e.
Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ ⇒ ∆
26
We transform this26 into:
D0
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
D1
ϕ, ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
ψ,Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
D0
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
D2
ϕ,¬ψ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′
(Cut)
¬ψ,Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
(GG)
ξ,¬ξ,Γ′,Γ⇒ ∆,∆′
2.3. The cut formula ϕ is principal in the derivation of both premises. The proof is
by induction on the complexity of ϕ. As already mentioned, the key observation is that c(ϕ) 6= 0.
In fact
• In FDE=, there is no rule introducing a literal on the right.
27
• In K3= and KS3= there is no rule introducing a literal on the right. That is the reason why
we formulated these systems with (RepL), as they both have one rule introducing literals
in the left, i.e. (¬L) and (GG).
• In LP there is no rule introducing a literal on the left. That is the reason why we formulated
LP via (RepR), as this calculus has one rule introducing literals on the right, i.e. (¬R).
The induction step is standard, i.e. one reduces the complexity of the cut formula.
Remark A.2. Let us remark that, according to Df 2.1 of the positive complexity of a formula,
¬ϕ and ¬ψ can be viewed as generalized subformulas of ¬(ϕ ◦ ψ), and similarly ¬ϕ as gener-
alized subformula of ¬Qϕ. Hence, even though the systems introduced above do not have the
subformula property in the ordinary sense, they satisfy a generalized version of this property (see
(Pynko, 1995, p. 447)).
26 More precisely we should have, say, ξ,¬ξ,Γ′,Γ′′ ⇒ ∆,∆′ where Γ = Γ′′, ξ,¬ξ.
27 Note: if one formulates FDE= as FDE + RepR, then there is no rule for introducing literal on the left.
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